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AS WINDING AS THE SERPENTINE WALL:  
 






Imagine a married couple, Sarah and David, that were 
madly in love with a life full of promise ahead of them. David, 
a general practice physician, was giddy at the thought of being 
a father. Sarah, for her part, picked up baby fever shortly after 
their marriage in 2017. The couple waited a year for David to 
finish his residency, and soon they were trying for a baby. 
At first, Sarah simply went off birth control. When 
pregnancy did not occur, they started timing Sarah’s cycles. A 
few months later they went to a fertilization specialist for tests 
and guidance, there they received bad news. Sarah’s ovaries 
had a deformity making pregnancy impossible. The couple was 
devastated and grieved at their lost hope but resolved to raise a 
child regardless.  
Sarah, being raised Southern Baptist, approached a 
Christian based adoption agency out of Nashville to engage 
their services. She arranged a meeting time when she and David 
were available to discuss their options. At the appointed hour, 
the couple walked into the front parlor and were directed to 




have a seat in their waiting area while they filled out 
preliminary paperwork. Once completed, they were called back 
into a small conference room. 
A lady entered with a somber look on her face. Curious, 
David and Sarah greeted her and proclaimed their excitement 
on becoming parents. At that, the lady turned to David and 
stated bluntly, “We don’t do mixed-race adoptions, because of 
our Christian belief.” Stunned, Sarah stated that she too was a 
Christian and asked, “What in the Bible led you to such a 
conclusion?” The lady responded, “I don’t want to argue my 
faith, we just don’t participate.” Unfortunately for the couple, 
David was Jewish.1  
This situation can befall any loving couple looking to 
adopt in Tennessee, thanks to the child placement law codified 
in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-147.2 While a typical child 
placement law focuses on the wellbeing of the child,3 this law 
enables a private child-placing agency to refuse to place a child 
with a stable and loving family if the placement violates “the 
agency’s written religious or moral convictions or policies.”4 
Religion and government both dominate our lives, 
regardless of our beliefs or political affiliations. Government is 
constantly present. From regulating businesses, building 
infrastructure, managing crises, educating citizens, and even 
controlling our bodies, government has a hand in nearly 
everything. At the same time, religion has an influence on many 
of these same areas, creating unavoidable conflicts. Religious 
organizations run hospitals, charities, schools, labor unions, 
sports organizations, and political associations just to name a 
few.  
Further complicating matters, religious views are 
expressed on our money, in our pledge of allegiance, during 
invocations of Congress, and even on the Supreme Court 
 
1 The couple’s conversation with the adoption agency was derived 
from a New York Time’s article. Karen Zraick, Mississippi Event Hall 
Refuses to Host Interracial Wedding, Then Apologizes, The New York 
Times (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/us/mississippi-interracial-
couple-wedding.html. 
2 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 (2020).  
3 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101 (2020).  
4 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 (2020). 
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Building.5 Contrasting these expressions, the United States 
Constitution neither mentions nor references God. Instead, the 
Constitution’s purpose as laid out in the Preamble is wholly 
secular, “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty.”6 
What are we to make of this conundrum? The late 
theologian Dr. David Dungan once stated that “there is a 
difference between ‘God and Country, and Church and State.’”7 
Invoking a higher power to benefit a country is akin to the 
Declaration of Independence invoking “Laws of Nature and 
Nature’s God” and appealing to “the Supreme Judge of the 
world.”8 The Declaration of Independence is not law, however, 
but rather a call of protest stating in broad and neutral terms 
that people’s rights are divine and unalienable.9  
The Constitution tells us the other side of the story, that 
our Government is a human endeavor and secular in nature. 
Indeed, it was Thomas Jefferson who later wrote that it was the 
“the legitimate power of government [to] reach actions only, 
and not opinions,” and that the Establishment Clause would 
“build[] a wall of separation between Church and State.”10 
Thus, if there is a clear demarcation between church and 
state; it is that government exists to regulate actions relating to 
justice, tranquility, defense, welfare, and liberty, but not to an 
individual’s freedom of conscience. Applied to today’s 
government, regulations which primarily touch upon the 
 
5 Moses, along with other lawgivers, is engraved above the Supreme 
Court Building’s entrance. Building Features, The Supreme Court of 
the United States, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/buildingfeatures.aspx (last 
visited April 20, 2020). 
6 U.S. Const. pmbl.  
7 Audiotape: Dr. David Laird Dungan, Formation of the New 
Testament, held by First Presbyterian Church in Knoxville, 
Tennessee (June 2005) (on file with author).  
8 Thomas Jefferson, the Declaration of Independence paras. 1 and 5 
(U.S. 1776).  
9 America’s Founding Documents, National Archives, 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration (last visited Nov. 18, 
2020). 
10 Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists Para. 2 
(U.S. 1802).  




secular welfare of the population ought to be considered 
primarily on a secular basis. When religious organizations take 
on secular activities, such as running a hospital or an adoption 
agency, government regulation should be neutral towards that 
religion’s beliefs while regulating the organization’s actions as 
it would a secular organization.  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 violates the Establishment 
Clause of both the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions. This child 
placement law allows private adoption agencies to discriminate 
against families under the guise of religion at the expense of 
foster children in need of a stable home. Lemon v. Kurzman 
created the appropriate test to determine the constitutionality 
of this law because it regulates a secular activity in which 
religious organizations participate.  
Under Lemon, the law has no secular purpose, it has the 
effect of advancing religion, and it fosters excessive 
entanglement between government and religion. As such, 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 should be struck down. This 
comment will show that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 does not 
comport with Lemon and is unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and Art. 1 § 3 of 
Tennessee’s Constitution. Part II delves into the Court’s 
inconsistent application of the Lemon test, examining which 
categories of Establishment Clause cases are best answered by 
Lemon. Part III explores Tennessee Establishment Clause 
precedent, including its faithful adherence to Lemon. Part IV 
examines Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 along with its legislative 
history. Part V argues that Lemon is the appropriate lens to 
analyze Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147. It then applies Lemon and 
proposes that the child-placement law be struck down. Part VI 
briefly concludes the examination into the law’s 
unconstitutionality. 
 
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNDER LEMON 
 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .”11  
The Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment 
Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in 
 
11 U.S. Const. amend. I.  
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1947.12 The case, Everson v. Board of Education, highlighted the 
establishment clause’s intention to raise “a wall of separation 
between church and State.”13 It did little, however, to create a 
legal framework for Establishment Clause cases to be analyzed.  
In 1971, a legal framework finally emerged in the case of 
Lemon v. Kurtzman.14 There, a unanimous Supreme Court 
created a three-part test to determine the constitutionality of 
legislative acts concerning the Establishment Clause.15 “First, 
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, it’s 
principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.”16 These 
elements were chosen with care and based on prior Court 
precedent.17 
The first prong of the test, whether the statute has a 
secular legislative purpose, focuses on the rationale underlying 
the state action or statute.18 The prong requires a statute to have 
a “secular legislative purpose.”19 This does not imply that there 
can be no religious purpose if an authentic secular purpose also 
exists.20 Importantly, the secular purpose must be genuine and 
not merely a “sham.”21 If the sole purpose of the state action is 
religious, the act is unconstitutional under Lemon, requiring no 
further inquiry into the second or third prongs.22  
The second prong is known as the effect prong.23 
Assuming a statute or act has a genuine secular purpose, the 
next step is to look at the “principal or primary effect” to see if 
 
12 Everson v. Bd. Of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  
13 Id. at 16.  
14 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
15 Id. at 612-13.  
16 Id.  
17 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Walz v. Tax 
Com. Of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).  
18 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.  
19 Id.  
20 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422 (1961) (‘[T]he 
“Establishment” Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of 
conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.’). 
21 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987).  
22 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).  
23 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 




the act “advances [or] inhibits religion.”24 The effect of the 
governmental action should not, at a minimum, give preference 
to one religion over another, including non-religion.25 
Government action should not have the effect of advancing or 
condemning a specific religion or religion generally.26 Thus, 
despite having a secular purpose, the effect of a statute or act 
may render it invalid under the Establishment Clause. 
The third prong asks whether a statute or act promotes 
excessive government entanglement with religion.27 The 
entanglement prong considers “the character and purposes of 
the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the 
State provides, and the resulting relationship between the 
government and the religious authority.”28 The idea is to avoid 
placing the state in a position where it is regulating religion so 
that any state action can be considered neutral with respect to 
religion.29  
Despite the apparent consensus, fissures in applying 
Lemon emerged after its implementation.30 The Supreme Court 
still purports to recognize and implement the Lemon test, but its 
application has been erratic and inconsistent. In certain cases, 
the Court has disregarded one or more of its elements.31 In 
others, the Court has re-interpreted the elements;32 and in 
 
24 Id. 
25 See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 53 (“[T]he individual freedom of conscience 
protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any 
religious faith or none at all.”). 
26 Id. at 54 (“[T]he political interest in forestalling intolerance extends 
beyond intolerance among Christian sects – or even intolerance 
among “religions” – to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and 
the uncertain.”). 
27 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
28 Id. at 615.  
29 See Id.  
30 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 801-02 (1983) 
(acknowledging the Lemon test but relying on historical significance 
instead).  
31 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620-21 (1989) (The 
“purpose” and “entanglement” prongs of Lemon were not 
considered by the Court). 
32 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 206 (1997) (“It is simplest to 
recognize why entanglement is significant and treat it . . . as an 
aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect.) 
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others still, the Court has declined to use the Lemon test 
altogether.33 
Justice’s Scalia and Thomas have argued doing away 
with the Lemon test altogether.34 Their arguments tend to attack 
Lemon for its inadequacy in solving different kinds of 
Establishment Clause cases, particularly those with regards to 
historic symbols, monuments, and practices. Better tests may be 
available for these types of cases, but for the cases Lemon is 
designed to answer, the Court has yet to conceive of a better 
test. This resulting trend of the fact-specific approach to 
Establishment Clause analysis in the United States, a bedrock 
protection under our Constitution, is to surrender guidance and 
consistency to a judge’s whim.  
Recently in Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Assoc., the Court 
noted that Lemon “attempted to find a grand unified theory of 
the Establishment Clause.”35 The Court did this to “bring order 
and predictability to Establishment Clause decision making.”36 
Unfortunately, the “grand unified theory” has been discarded 
by the Court in favor of fact-specific determinations that rely on 
differing factors depending on what kind of Establishment 
Clause case is at hand.37 
According to Justice Kavanaugh, there are five separate 
categories of Establishment Clause cases: “(1) religious symbols 
on government property and religious speech at government 
events; (2) religious accommodations and exemptions from 
generally applicable laws; (3) government benefits and tax 
exemptions for religious organizations; (4) religious expression 
in public schools; and (5) regulation of private religious speech 
in public forums.”38 Justice Kavanaugh goes on to explain that 
"the Lemon test does not explain the Court’s decisions in any of 
those five categories.”39 
 
33 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719 (2018) (ignoring Lemon entirely).  
34 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
398 (1993) (Justice Scalia’s concurrence compares Lemon to “some 
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave 
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried.”). 
35 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n., 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2071 (2019). 
36 Id. at 2080.  
37 Id. at 2092 (Justice Kavanaugh concurring). 
38 Id.  
39 Id.  




While the Court has segmented categories of 
Establishment Clause cases differently,40 there is at least one 
category in which the Lemon test is appropriate: Government 
acts that regulate secular activities in which religious 
institutions take part.  
In 1968, Pennsylvania enacted a statute providing 
financial support to nonpublic schools for the purpose of 
reimbursing textbooks, teacher salaries, and instructional 
materials on specific secular subjects.41 Most of these schools 
were church based.42 Although the statute had a primary 
purpose of ensuring the quality of secular education in all 
schools, the programs fostered excessive government 
entanglement with religion.43 This was due to the degree of 
state supervision and surveillance necessary to ensure 
compliance with the statutory requirements separating secular 
and religious education.44  
The act prospectively regulated a secular activity, 
education. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the non-
public schools under the regulation were Roman Catholic, at 
around 95%.45 Finally, because Lemon failed the excessive 
entanglement prong of its test, the Pennsylvania statute was 
held unconstitutional.46  
By contrast, historic symbols and monuments are not 
functions at all. Although many are secular in nature, such as 
an obelisk or war memorial, many others are not.47 Further 
complicating matters, historic landmarks often have evolving 
and multiple meanings over time.48 Applying Lemon simply 
makes little sense in these arenas, because the questions asked 
by Lemon are inconsistent with the nature of those kinds of 
Establishment Clause cases.  
 
40 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583 n.4 (“[A] historical approach is not useful 
in determining the proper roles of church and state in public schools, 
since free public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the 
Constitution was adopted.”) 
41 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.  
42 Id. at 608.  
43 Id. at 614.  
44 Id. at 620-21.  
45 Id. at 608.  
46 Id. at 615.  
47 Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2082.  
48 Id. at 2084. 
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For instance, what is the primary secular purpose of 
maintaining a hundred-year-old Latin cross originally created 
by a private entity to honor WWI Veterans?49 Every bystander 
will have a different takeaway based on their preferences and 
biases, rendering the question unanswerable. Does installing a 
statue of the Ten Commandments near a government building 
have the effect of advancing a specific religion over others?50 
Does it have the effect of advancing religion generally over non-
religion? While many have said yes,  many others point to 
Abraham’s tablets as a moral foundational to law and order.51  
How about allowing prayer before a session of 
legislature?52 One might expect that to foster excessive 
entanglement between government and religion; but opening a 
legislative session with a prayer of invocation is a longstanding 
practice that pre-dates the First Amendment altogether.53 The 
Lemon test is ill equipped to answer these difficult questions due 
to their subjective meanings and historical weight. 
Lemon is inherently forward looking, as in its first 
application to Pennsylvania’s classroom law. There in its proper 
use, the state was regulating religious organizations that took 
on a secular activity.54 Although Lemon does not always lead to 
consistent results when applied to historic symbols, 
monuments, or longstanding practices, it is the only 
unanimously approved Supreme Court test in an Establishment 
Clause case.55 As in the original Pennsylvania case, applying 
Lemon is the best possible solution when dealing with a 
government act that regulates secular activities in which 




49 Id. at 2082 (the Court analyzing the purpose of a thirty-two-foot 
tall Latin cross). 
50 Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), with McCreary 
Cnty. V. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).  
51 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. at 691-92 (“The inclusion of the Ten 
Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance, 
partaking of both religion and government.”). 
52 Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (the Court held Nebraska’s practice of opening 
legislative sessions with a prayer constitutional). 
53 Id. at 795.  
54 Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.  
55 Id.  




III. ARTICLE 1 § 3 OF TENNESSEE’S CONSTITUTION UNDER 
LEMON 
 
“That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own 
conscience; that no man can of right be compelled to attend, 
erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
minister against his consent; that no human authority can, in 
any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of 
conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given, by law, 
to any religious establishment or mode of worship.”56 
 
The time has come for Tennessee’s Supreme Court to 
once again clarify the state’s Establishment Clause doctrine, 
and the best route is through the Lemon test. Tennessee’s 
Establishment Clause doctrine has evolved alongside the 
Federal Courts, but unlike the Federal Courts, Tennessee has 
held steadfast to Lemon. Where Tennessee Courts have chosen 
not to rely on Lemon, they have assented to the Establishment 
Clause’s essential tenet.57 
“Tenn. Const. art. I, § 3 and the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution arise from the same constitutional 
milieu.”58 This is not to say the two amendments are identical, 
but that they are born out of the same idea “foreclos[ing] the 
establishment of a state or national religion similar to other 
eighteenth century systems.”59 As early as 1956, Tennessee’s 
Supreme Court held that while the two amendments “are 
practically synonymous,” Tennessee’s provisions are “broader 
and more comprehensive.”60 
 
 A. SERPENTS, BOOZE, AND A SATAN-FREE CURRICULUM 
 
In a 1975 case, Tennessee’s Supreme Court had to 
consider whether drinking strychnine poison and handling 
 
56 Tenn. Const. art 1, § 3. 
57 See State v. Crank, 468 S.W.3d 15, 30 n.8 (2015) (quoting James 
Madison saying “[t]o give exemption to some denominations and 
not to all offends the equality with which all men enter society.”). 
58 Martin v. Beer Bd., 908 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).  
59 Id.  
60 Carden v. Bland, 288 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tenn. 1956).  
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snakes were legitimate parts of a church’s religious service.61 
The Lemon test was not implemented because the question was 
not predicated on a previous state action but revolved around 
whether the state may enjoin a religious group from handling 
snakes during worship under a public nuisance theory.62 Still, 
the court took pains to point out that while the “right to believe 
is absolute; the right to act is subject to reasonable regulation 
designed to protect a compelling state interest.”63  
In holding that a permanent injunction was in order, the 
Court stated that art. 1, § 3 of Tennessee’s Constitution is 
“substantially stronger” than the provisions of the First 
Amendment.64 The Court then stated that regardless, “a 
religious practice may be limited, curtailed or restrained to the 
point of outright prohibition, where it involves a clear and 
present danger to the interests of society.”65  
In a separate case that year, Tennessee declared its 
adherence to the Lemon test.66 Similar to the Pennsylvania 
statute in Lemon, the case involved a state education statute. The 
Tennessee statute prohibited teaching creationism in public 
school textbooks unless it was taught as opinion rather than 
scientific fact.67 In stating that the Act was “unconstitutional on 
its face,” the Court agreed with a Sixth Circuit opinion that it 
failed under Lemon.68  
The Act failed the effect prong of the Lemon test because 
it favored “the Bible of the Jews,” demonstrating “another 
method of preferential treatment of particular faiths by state 
law.”69 Further, “the statute would inextricably involve the 
State Textbook Commission in . . . Chief Justice Burger’s third 
standard” set out in Lemon.70 The opinion continued, “[i]t would 
be utterly impossible for the Textbook Commission to 
determine which religious theories were ‘occult’ or ‘satanical’ 
without seeking to resolve the theologians through the ages.”71 
 
61 State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975).  
62 Id. at 102.  
63 Id. at 107.  
64 Id. at 111.  
65 Id.  
66 Steele v. Waters, 527 S.W.2d 72 (Tenn. 1975).  
67 Id. at 73.  
68 Id. at 73-74.  
69 Id. at 73.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  




Thus, the Act fostered an excessive entanglement between 
government and church.72 
In Martin v. Beer, Tennessee’s Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of banning the sale of beer on 
Sundays.73 The Court emphasized the secular importance of 
regulating the sale of beer as it is considered “dangerous to the 
community.”74 Justice Koch’s opinion continues with a lengthy 
analysis over the Constitutional prohibition against religious 
preferences, affirming Lemon in the process.75  
The opinion first acknowledges that the “separation 
between church and state is blurred and indistinct and varies 
with the circumstances.”76 Nevertheless, the opinion then 
emphatically adheres to the Lemon test, stating that “in order to 
prevent the wall of separation between church and state from 
becoming as winding as the serpentine wall Thomas Jefferson 
designed for the University of Virginia, the Court has found it 
useful to examine the statute from three vantage points.”77 
The three vantage points referenced above are the three 
prongs of Lemon: a statute’s secular purpose, it’s principle or 
primary effect, and whether it fosters excessive governmental 
entanglement with religion.78 The opinion then adopts a fourth 
prong suggested by Justice O’Connor known as the 
“endorsement analysis” prong.79 It asks, “whether a reasonable 
observer would view such longstanding practices as a 
disapproval of his or her particular religious choices, in light of 
the fact that they serve a secular purpose rather than a sectarian 
one and have largely lost their religious significance over 
time.”80  
In applying this modified Lemon test, the opinion states 
that although statutes regulating the sale of beer were originally 
religiously motivated, as early as 1852 courts began recognizing 
Sunday closing laws as having a secular purpose.81 Prohibiting 
the sale of beer on Sunday neither advances nor inhibits 
 
72 Id.  
73 Martin, 908 S.W.2d 941.  
74 Id. at 945.  
75 Id. at 950-51.  
76 Id. at 950.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 950-51. 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 952.  
AS WINDING AS THE SERPENTINE WALL 411 
 411 
religion.82 Further, it does not foster excessive governmental 
entanglement with religion.83 Finally, in applying Justice 
O’Connor’s fourth prong, “a reasonable observer would not 
equate the adoption of such an ordinance as governmental 
approval or disapproval of his or her particular religious 
beliefs.”84  
As recently as 2013, Tennessee courts have continued 
applying Lemon in Establishment Clause cases.85 In Christ 
Church Pentecostal, the question was whether a bookstore/café 
area contained in a church family life center should qualify for 
a tax exemption.86 The Court of Appeals relied on Lemon to hold 
that the bookstore was “nothing short of a retail establishment 
housed within the walls of the center, complete with paid staff, 
inventory control, retail pricing, and a wide array of 
merchandise for sale to the general public.”87 
The court held that the taxation statutes have a clear 
secular purpose, they should be applied “equitably is a 
constitutional mandate.”88 In opposition, the Plaintiff’s position 
was that taxing the bookstore “impermissibly entangles the 
State in matter of church doctrine by defining a ‘religious 
use.’”89 The court held to the contrary, stating the “imposition 
of property tax on church property that is . . . essentially 
commercial in nature does not interfere with [Christ Church 
Pentecostal’s] doctrine, beliefs, faith, or government.”90 Thus, 
under the Lemon test, taxing a church’s retail bookstore and café 
as a secular business does not violate the Establishment Clause, 
despite accepting the church’s “assertion that providing ‘third 
spaces’ is part of its outreach ministry.”91  
Although slighted and battered in Federal courts, 
Tennessee courts embrace Lemon as the most faithful execution 
of Establishment Clause doctrine. While at times this has 
 
82 Id. at 954.  
83 Id. at 954-55 (though not explicitly stated, the court held that the 
law does not violate Tenn. Const. art. I, § 3).  
84 Id. at 954. 
85 Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tenn. State bd. Of Equalization, 428 
S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).  
86 Id. at 804.  
87 Id. at 813.  
88 Id. at 815.  
89 Id. at 814.  
90 Id. at 818. 
91 Id. at 818-19.  




included Justice O’Connor’s fourth “endorsement analysis” 
prong, it is only helpful in circumstances that include 
“longstanding practices.”92 When those circumstances are not 
present, Tennessee should continue relying on Lemon as the 
proper lens in analyzing Establishment Clause cases involving 
a government regulation over primarily secular activities in 
which religious institutions participate.  
 
IV. TENNESSEE’S ADOPTION STATUTE AND ITS LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY 
 
In January of 2020, Tennessee’s Governor Bill Lee signed 
into law Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147, which now regulates the 
relationship between state government and privately-operated 
child-placing agencies in Tennessee.93 The bill states that “no 
private licensed child-placing agency shall be required to . . . 
participate in any placement of a child for foster care or 
adoption when the proposed placement would violate the 
agency’s written religious or moral convictions or policies.”94 
The bill allows child-placing agencies in Tennessee to 
discriminate against anyone when deciding whether or not to 
allow a child’s adoption to proceed, so long as the 
discrimination is articulated in the agency’s “written religious 
or moral convictions or policies” to “the extent allowed by 
federal law.”95 
The child placement bill further protects private 
adoption agencies by preventing the department of children’s 
services from denying licensure due to their “objection to . . . 
participating in a placement that violates the agency’s written 
religious or moral convictions or policies.”96 It continues by 
stating that “a state or local government entity shall not deny to 
a private licensed child-placing agency any [financial 
assistance] because of the agency’s objection to . . . participating 
in a placement that violates the agency’s written religious or 
moral convictions or policies.”97 Finally, the bill states that an 
agency’s refusal to participate in “a placement that violates the 
 
92 Martin, 908 S.W.2d at 951.  
93 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147.  
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
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agency’s written religious or moral convictions or policies shall 
not form the basis of a civil action for either damages or 
injunctive relief.”98 
To restate, this bill allows a private child-placing agency 
to discriminate based on “written religious or moral convictions 
or policies.”99 It then prevents the department of children’s 
services from denying licensure, the state and local 
governments from withholding financial support, and any civil 
litigation in Tennessee based on an agency’s “written religious 
or moral convictions or policies.”100 
 As with many religious bills introduced in recent 
history, this child placement bill was written and advanced by 
the Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation, a non-profit 
religious political organization.101 The foundation’s vision 
includes preserving Judeo-Christian heritage and promoting 
prayer.102 Initiatives for carrying out this vision include the 
foundation’s American Prayer Caucus Network to “promote 
prayer and use the legislative process to preserve our nation’s 
Judeo-Christian heritage,” and In God We Trust, Put It Up! to 
encourage the display of In God We Trust in schools and 
government buildings.103  
Another of the foundation’s initiatives is known as 
Project Blitz, which proposes religiously motivated Christian 
heritage bills.104 In 2018 alone, Project Blitz proposed over 200 
Christian heritage bills in over 32 states and Congress. To date, 
over 60 such bills have been signed into law.105  
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One of the project’s overarching priorities includes 
pushing for public policies in favor of biblical values 
concerning marriage and sexuality.106 This category includes 
legislation allowing state occupational license holders, such as 
barbers, lawyers, health care providers, and adoption agencies 
to discriminate on the basis of their sincerely held religious 
beliefs.107  
In 2020, Tennessee became the latest state to utilize the 
foundation’s language when it passed its child placement bill.108 
Rep. Tim Rudd from Murfreesboro sponsored the bill in the 
House. He said the child placement bill did not originate with 
Project Blitz, but rather was based on Virginia’s law.109 Rudd 
continued that it was given to him by John Bumpus, a trustee 
on the board for Tennessee Baptist Children’s Homes, a private 
child-placing agency that vets prospective parents based on 
religion.110 Despite Rudd’s assertion as to the bill’s origin, 
Virginia’s religious adoption bill was written by the 
Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation as part of Project 
Blitz.111 
In the House Children & Families Subcommittee, Rep. 
Rudd first introduced the child placement bill for 
consideration.112 He said the bill’s purpose was to protect faith-
based child-placing agencies from frivolous lawsuits so they 
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immediate pushback from attorney Stacey Odneal, a Tennessee 
specialist in child law, who pointed out that there were nearly 
8,000 foster children in Tennessee, half of which do not 
currently live in stable households.114 After concluding, the bill 
was voted out of the committee.115 
The bill then went to the Judiciary Committee. There, 
Rep. Karen Camper spoke next. She asked if a faith-based 
adoption agency can deny an atheist the ability to adopt.116 Rep. 
Rudd responded that it would only occur if the agency had a 
written statement to that effect.117 She followed up by asking if 
there was a level of proof required for a faith-based adoption 
agency to prove that an individual does not conform to their 
beliefs.118 Rep. Rudd admitted that the bill does not address that 
question, but simply gives rights to faith-based agencies.119  
Once on the House floor, Rep. Bo Mitchell spoke up. He 
said he was concerned that if he had a Jewish family in his 
district, they would be unable to adopt from an agency with 
moral convictions when there are so many kids in need of a 
good home.120 Rep. Rudd responded that he could not predict 
what a religious agency would do because it wasn’t in his bill.121 
Rep. John Ray Clemmons then asked to what extent federal law 
allowed adoption agencies to discriminate based on their 
religious beliefs.122 Rep. Rudd stated that he could not talk 
about things outside the bill.123 
Between March of 2019 and January of 2020, the child-
placement bill sat in limbo before finally being presented in the 
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Senate. There, bill sponsor Sen. Paul Rose began debating Sen. 
Jeff Yarbro about the merits of a proposed amendment.124 Sen. 
Yarbro wanted to remove the provision extending the 
legislation to government contracts, grants, and programs.125 
His concern was for the separation of church and state, 
suggesting that the bill only apply to private religious 
institutions that do not rely on public tax-payer dollars.126  
Sen. Rose was not amused by the proposal, stating that 
the amendment “is insidious and hostile by wiping out the 
intent of this bill.”127 Sen. Yarbro asserted that private actors 
become public actors when they use public dollars to do a 
public function on behalf of the public.128 He argued that there 
is no right to enter into a contract with the government and 
urged passage of his amendment because we should not allow 
the bill to extend to protected taxpayer dollars.129 Sen. Rose 
moved to table the amendment, and it was promptly 
seconded.130  
Sen. Steven Dickerson spoke next, asking “what’s the 
intent of this bill?”131 Sen. Rose initially evaded the question by 
responding it was to codify existing practices in the State of 
Tennessee.132 Sen. Dickerson pushed back and asked Sen. Rose 
to cite an example of a family or family structure where an 
agency felt compelled to place children against their will.133 Sen. 
Rose responded, “this prevents an agency that based on their 
stated religious moral convictions do not choose to place a child 
with a non-conventional, in my opinion a conventional home, 
which is a married mother and father, cannot be forced to do 
so.”134 When asked if a Muslim adoption agency could refuse 
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services to an Episcopalian family or vice-versa, Sen. Rose 
responded “I’m not a lawyer, but that’s my understanding.”135 
Sen. Dickerson then brought up the humanitarian impact on 
those children who could have a forever home but will now 
have to wait a longer period of time.136 Dickerson closed by 
saying this was bad for public policy.137 
Towards the end of the debate, Sen. Mike Bale asked 
how many agencies across the state are religious versus secular 
based.138 Sen. Rose did not know the answer but guessed the 
majority were faith based.139 Finally, Sen. Rose moved for the 
bill’s third and final consideration. It passed the Senate 20 ayes 
to 6 nays.140  
 
V. TENNESSEE’S ADOPTION STATUTE UNDER LEMON 
 
The Lemon test is the appropriate test to analyze the 
constitutionality of Tennessee’s recent child placement law. 
Created to determine the constitutionality of legislative acts 
concerning the Establishment Clause, there is no better lens 
when applied to legislative acts involving government 
regulations over a primarily secular activity.  
Tennessee’s child placement law falls into this category. 
Codified at the end of Tennessee’s chapter on adoption, the act 
regulates the relationship between government and private 
child placement agencies.141 The threshold question then is 
whether a private child-placing agency primarily conducts a 
secular activity or function. This is easily answered in the 
affirmative.  
Tennessee’s adoption statute clearly states that its 
primary purpose is to “effectuate to the greatest extent possible 
the rights and interests of persons affected by adoption, 
especially those of the adopted persons, which are specifically 
protected by the constitutions of the United States and the state 
of Tennessee.”142 The statute continues by stating that actions 
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should be done “consistent with the best interest of the child,” 
recognizing “[t]he rights of children to be raised in loving 
homes.”143 The statute’s section concludes, “[i]n all cases, when 
the best interests of the child and those of the adults are in 
conflict, such conflict shall always be resolved to favor the 
rights and the best interests of the child.”144 Clearly, adoption 
services constitute a primarily secular state function.  
Having determined that Lemon is the appropriate test, 
the next question becomes which version should the courts rely 
on. Should Justice O’Connor’s fourth line of inquiry be included 
in the analysis? The appropriate situations to utilize the 
“endorsement analysis” prong involve situations which 
include a longstanding practice.145 Here, there is no 
longstanding state practice of condoning religiously motivated 
adoption policies by private child placing agencies. The 
adoption statute’s purpose as stated above indicates as much.146 
Therefore, the Lemon test’s original three prongs remain the best 
tool to analyze Tennessee’s child placement law.  
Starting with the secular purpose prong, the focus is on 
the rationale underlying the state action or statute.147 Looking 
at the statute, a plain reading indicates that it protects a “private 
licensed child-placing agency” from both governmental and 
private actions on the basis of “the agency’s written religious or 
moral convictions or policies.”148 This runs counter to the stated 
constitutional protections “consistent with the best interest of 
the child” codified in Tennessee’s adoption statute.149 There is 
no secular purpose in protecting a private child-placing agency 
based on its religious convictions when the protections come at 
the expense of constitutionally protected children’s rights. 
In contrast, Christ Church Pentecostal is Tennessee’s best 
example of a statute upheld has having a clear secular 
purpose.150 The taxation statute’s primary purpose is to raise 
revenue for Tennessee.151 By applying the tax to all retail 
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establishments, including the church in question, the statute 
operates equitably under its constitutional mandate.152 There is 
no religious purpose to taxing retail establishments uniformly 
regardless of their ownership. The same cannot be said of 
Tennessee’s child placement law.  
Should the purpose still be in dispute, diving into the 
child placement law’s legislative history is instructive. The bill’s 
language is derived from a non-profit religious political 
organization whose stated vision includes the preservation of 
Judeo-Christian heritage.153 Despite Rep. Rudd’s assertion that 
he does not know about Project Blitz, he acknowledged 
receiving the bill from a trustee on the board for Tennessee 
Baptist Children’s Homes.154 Regardless, Tennessee’s child-
placement law was written and advanced by religious 
organizations. 
More telling still, Rep. Rudd clearly stated on the House 
subcommittee that the purpose of his sponsored bill was to 
protect religiously affiliated adoption agencies.155 In the Senate, 
bill sponsor Sen. Paul Rose initially stated the bill’s intent was 
to codify existing practices in the state of Tennessee.156 After 
being nudged for further insight he continued, “this prevents 
an agency that based on their stated religious moral convictions 
do not choose to place a child with a non-conventional, in my 
 
152 Id. at 815. 
153 Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation, Vision, 
https://cpcfoundation.com/about/mission/ (last visited April 20, 
2020). 
154 The Center for Public Integrity, Adoption Centers: The Latest 




De9gXP2BLO8DFIBgb7ZAN59p3x-JS9_c (last visited April 20, 2020). 
155  The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the 
Children and Families Subcommittee, 2019 Leg., 111th General 
Assembly (Tenn. 2019), 
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
16680 (last visited April 20, 2020). 
156 The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the Senate 
Session, 2020 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn. 2020), 
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
21093 (last visited April 20, 2020). 




opinion a conventional home, which is a married mother and 
father, cannot be forced to do so.”157 
As a plain reading of the child-placement law and its 
legislative history suggests, the purpose to this bill is to protect 
religious child-placing agencies. Specifically, it is to protect 
them from actions adverse to the Tennessee adoption statute’s 
secular purpose to act in ways “consistent with the child’s best 
interests.”158 Thus, the bill’s purpose is religiously motivated 
and has no secular purpose. Since the sole purpose of the act is 
religious, it is unconstitutional under Lemon and requires no 
further inquiry.159  
For the sake of a thorough analysis, however, the next 
prong to be utilized is the effect prong. Asking whether the 
child-placement law has the “principal or primary effect” of 
“advanc[ing or] inhibit[ing] religion,” leads to two difficult 
questions.160 The first question is whether an act advances or 
condemns a specific religion.161 If this prong is to be interpreted 
so narrowly, then the child-placement law might pass this 
prong of the test.  
Turning again to legislative history, Sen. Rose was 
asked if a Muslim adoption agency could refuse services to an 
Episcopalian family or vice versa.162 In response he stated that 
was his understanding.163 Thus, the legislative history suggests 
that the bill does not on its face advance a specific religion over 
others. Further, the bill mentions no specific religion, sect, or 
denomination, but simply “the agency’s written religious or 
moral convictions or policies.”164  
However, the second prong’s question does not ask 
whether the intent of an act advances a specific religion, but 
whether an act has the effect of advancing a specific religion.165 
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Answering this question is more difficult, but not wholly 
unanswerable. When Sen. Bale asked how many private 
licensed agencies were religious as opposed to secular, Sen. 
Rose admitted he did not know specifically but guessed the 
majority were faith based.166 If this is the case, then based on 
Tennessee’s demographics the majority of faith-based child-
placement agencies are likely Christian.167 While this question 
goes beyond the scope of this writing, there is a reasonable 
chance that the child placement law has the effect of advancing 
a specific religion, and would fail the second prong.  
The second question in the second prong asks whether 
the act advances or inhibits religion generally against non-
religion.168 Here again, the legislative history is helpful. When 
asked by Rep. Karen Camper whether a faith-based adoption 
agency can deny an atheist the ability to adopt, Rep. Rudd 
responded that it would so long as the agency had a written 
statement to that effect.169 Even if faith-based adoption agencies 
were in the minority of private adoption agencies statewide, the 
child-placement bill has the effect of allowing religiously 
affiliated agencies to discriminate but does not allow secular 
agencies to do the same. Thus, the bill fails Lemon’s second 
prong requirement that a bill’s effect be neutral to religion 
generally.  
Turning now to Lemon’s third prong, whether a statute 
promotes excessive government entanglement with religion, 
the answer is again yes. Focusing on the “the resulting 
relationship between the government and religious 
authority,”170 this bill invites the kind of regulation on religion 
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that the Establishment Clause was meant to prevent. For 
instance, Rep. Camper asked what level of proof was required 
for a faith-based adoption agency to prove that an individual 
does not conform to their beliefs.171 Rep. Rudd declined to 
answer, saying that the bill does not address that question, but 
simply gives rights to faith-based agencies.172 
Rep. Camper’s question was prescient, as it is one 
Tennessee courts will be forced to confront. If there is no level 
of proof required for a private adoption agency to deny their 
services, then it need not limit its discrimination to its “written 
religious or moral convictions or policies.”173 If an agency has a 
written statement that they do not accept atheists, they have no 
requirement to prove that an adoptive family is atheist. A 
prospective parent could take a pledge of faith, have their 
pastor write a note, or even consent to a baptism and it wouldn’t 
amount to sufficient proof to force an agency to abide by its own 
written policy.  
If there is a level of proof required to demonstrate that 
an agency is abiding by its “written religious or moral 
convictions or policies,”174 then the courts will be in the 
awkward position of dissecting what does and does not count 
as a religious moral conviction. This is the very “wall between 
church and state” that the Establishment Clause was meant to 
uphold.175 The government should not position itself such that 
it will be forced to determine what counts as a religious 
conviction. Determinations over theology tread on the freedom 
of conscience and should only be done when there is a 
compelling state interest, such as in Tennessee’s snake handling 
case.176 
There is no better example of a law which fails the third 
prong than in the original Lemon case.177 There, the degree of 
 
171 The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the 
Judiciary Committee, 2019 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn. 
2019), 
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
16847 (statement by Rep. Karen Camper) (last visited April 20, 2020). 
172 Id. (statement by Rep. Tim Rudd).  
173 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147.  
174 Id.  
175 Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists Para. 
2 (U.S. 1802). 
176 Swann, 527 S.W.2d 99.  
177 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
AS WINDING AS THE SERPENTINE WALL 423 
 423 
state supervision and surveillance necessary to ensure 
compliance with the statutory requirement separating secular 
and religious education was found to foster excessive 
governmental entanglement.178 It is hard to imagine a more 
entangled government than when a court considers doctrinal 
theology for the purposes of deciding whether an adoption 
agency’s “written religious or moral convictions or policies” are 
sincere or applied honestly.  
Another intersection that could lead to entanglement 
was highlighted when Rep. John Ray Clemmons asked to what 
extent federal law allowed adoption agencies to discriminate 
based on their religious beliefs.179 Rep. Rudd again stated that 
he could not talk about things outside the bill.180 This oversight 
by Rep. Rudd signals that it will be the courts’ task to balance 
these interests. May a faith-based child placing agency 
discriminate on the basis of race or other protected classes? 
Would gender be protected as a basis for discrimination by a 
religiously motivated adoption agency? These questions are 
likely to come up due to this legislation and foster additional 
entanglement. 
Further entanglement can be gleaned from Sen. Yarbro’s 
rejected amendment calling for the bill to only apply to private 
religious institutions that do not rely on public tax-payer 
dollars.181 Sen. Rose’s outright condemnation of this 
amendment acknowledges that under this bill, the government 
subsidizes religious institutions with taxpayer money for 
performing a secular function while retaining the right to 
discriminate based on its religious beliefs.182 Thus, Tennessee’s 
child-placement law fosters excessive government 
entanglement by placing the state in a position where it is 
regulating religion. 
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Tennessee’s recently passed child-placement law is 
unconstitutional. Lemon is the appropriate test for an 
Establishment Clause case relating to government regulations 
over secular activities, and the child-placement law’s regulation 
over child placement agencies clearly involves a secular 
activity. Applying Lemon shows that the law has no secular 
purpose, the primary effect advances religion generally, and it 
encourages excessive government entanglement. Thus, 
Tennessee’s child-placement law failed all three of Lemon’s 




Tennessee’s recently passed child-placement law is 
unconstitutional under both the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment and under Article 1 § 3 of Tennessee’s 
Constitution. After a careful determination that Lemon is the 
appropriate test for this kind of Establishment Clause case, one 
where the government regulates a secular activity in which 
religious establishments participate, the law failed all three of 
Lemon’s prongs. The law has no secular purpose, the primary 
effect advances religion generally, and it encourages excessive 
governmental entanglement.  
Thankfully, Sarah and David are a fictitious couple and 
will never know the pain of being turned away due to 
circumstances outside of their control. More thankfully still, 
there is no child on the other side of their story, waiting for a 
loving home. But for thousands of children in Tennessee’s 
foster system today, the threat that they will be kept in unstable 
situations away from a loving forever home is all too real.183  
Tennessee’s child-placement law continues to allow 
similar situations to flourish at the expense of a constitutionally 
protected class.184 Further, it runs counter to the Tennessee 
adoption statute’s promise that, “[i]n all cases, when the best 
interests of the child and those of the adults are in conflict, such 
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conflict shall always be resolved to favor the rights and the best 
interests of the child.”185 For these reasons, Tennessee Code 
Ann. § 36-1-147 is unconstitutional.  
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